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Abstract 
 
Does monitoring past conduct facilitate intertemporal cooperation? We designed an experiment 
characterized by strategic uncertainty and multiple equilibria where coordinating on the efficient 
outcome is a challenge. Participants, interacting anonymously in a group, could pay a cost either 
to obtain information about their counterparts, or to create a freely available public record of 
individual conduct. Both monitoring institutions were actively employed. However, groups were 
unable to attain higher levels of cooperation compared to a treatment without monitoring. 
Information about past conduct alone thus appears to be ineffective in overcoming coordination 
challenges. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents an experimental study of monitoring institutions that are designed to 
facilitate long-run cooperation among strangers. In the experiment, efficiency is theoretically 
possible but is difficult to achieve in practice because interactions are anonymous, there are 
multiple equilibria and strategic uncertainty (Van Huyck et al., 1991). 
To ameliorate these difficulties, we introduce means of monitoring past conduct and we 
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investigate whether or not this can help groups coordinating on the cooperative equilibrium. We 
consider two different monitoring institutions. In the Information Request treatment, participants 
can pay a small cost to receive accurate information about the counterpart; in the Information 
Provision treatment, participants can pay a small cost to help create an accurate public record of 
individual conduct. The Information Provision treatment introduces a monitoring institution that 
resembles a Better Business Bureau and, historically, it echoes the medieval Law Merchant 
institution for long-distance trade (Milgrom et al., 1990). The Information Request treatment 
introduces a monitoring institution similar to a credit bureau. By design, neither of these 
institutions expands the set of equilibrium payoffs, i.e., full cooperation is self-sustaining in all 
treatments through the aforementioned general convention. However, accurate monitoring can 
support conditional cooperation and, more generally, a variety of reciprocity-based strategies. 
To model long-run cooperation, we study a helping game that is played in a stable group of 
four individuals (Camera et al., 2013) and is indefinitely repeated (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994). 
In the group, participants interact in pairs with counterparts that change at random in each round 
of play. Relying on relational contracting is ruled out by design because participants’ identities 
always remain hidden and participants cannot communicate. In every round, two pairs are 
formed, both with one buyer and one seller. The seller can either consume a good in her 
possession or transfer it to the buyer. Transferring the good is socially efficient because the buyer 
values it more than the seller. However, the seller has an incentive to behave opportunistically 
and consume the good. A general convention of gift-exchange among group participants can 
sustain the efficient outcome in the long-run, provided that it incorporates a decentralized 
punishment scheme capable of deterring defections. Theory suggests that if such convention is 
based on the threat of a permanent and irreversible switch from cooperation to defection, then 
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this is sufficient to remove opportunistic temptations in a group of homogeneous individuals 
(Kandori, 1992, Ellison, 1994). 
Within this framework, full cooperation is self-sustaining and formal institutions that support 
communication, monitoring, punishment, etc. are typically considered theoretically unnecessary 
to reach efficiency. However, there is strategic uncertainty because individuals are unsure which 
equilibrium strategy others will use (Van Huyck et al., 1991, p. 234). It is interesting to note that 
a typical assumption in applications of the theory of infinitely repeated games is that individuals 
successfully coordinate on the best outcome. However, previous experiments have shown that 
the fact that cooperation is an equilibrium is not sufficient for cooperation to arise among 
strangers (Camera and Casari, 2009, 2014) or among partners (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011). 
In our experiment the availability of monitoring in the form of Information Request and 
Information Provision did not facilitate the successful coordination on long-run cooperation. 
Cooperative conventions struggled to emerge despite the heavy use of the monitoring 
institutions, something that in principle could have simplified coordination tasks. In fact, the data 
reveal that when participants had the option to contribute to creating a public record of past 
conduct, groups cooperated even less than in the absence of any monitoring institution. This 
evidence suggests that to overcome equilibrium coordination challenges, groups of strangers 
need institutions that are complementary to monitoring, such as enforcement institutions, for 
example. 
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the experimental design. 
Section 3 offers some theoretical considerations. Section 4 reports the results, Section 5 
discusses related studies, and Section 6 offers some final considerations. 
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2. The design of the experiment 
The experimental design is related to the model adopted in Camera and Casari (2014), where 
strangers can engage in an inter-temporal giving and receiving of goods. There are three 
treatments (Table 1). 
     In all treatments, interaction consists of the following helping game. There is a seller who can 
consume a good in her possession or transfer it to a buyer who values it comparatively more. The 
seller can either consume the good (=defection) or transfer it (=cooperation), while the buyer has 
no action to take. The payoffs for seller and buyer are, respectively, (a, a) with a>0 under 
defection, and (d, u) under cooperation, with d(0, a) and u >2a -d. In the experiment d=2, a=8, 
u=20. Although defection is a dominant action for the seller, cooperation maximizes total surplus 
to in the pair (6 points=22-16 points). 
     Players interact within a four-player group for an indefinite number of rounds. In each round 
two pairs are first randomly formed. Then, roles are randomly assigned so that each pair has one 
buyer and one seller. In this indefinitely repeated game, the efficient outcome is attained when 
cooperation occurs in every pair and in every round until the game stops (= full cooperation). 
     We implement indefinite repetition following the technique in Roth and Murnigham (1978). 
A supergame or cycle is characterized by a random continuation rule The rule specifies that at 
the end of each round an additional round of play takes place with probability  = 0.93. The 
duration of the interaction is therefore always uncertain. However, in each round the supergame 
is expected to go on for approximately 13 additional rounds, i.e., 1/(1)-1, no matter how many 
rounds have been played.  The continuation probability δ is interpreted as the discount factor of a 
risk-neutral participant. In the experiment a computer randomly selected an integer between 1 
and 100 from a uniform distribution, and the supergame terminated for all session participants, 
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when the drawn number exceeded 93.  
Each experimental session employed twenty participants who played five consecutive cycles. 
In total, this amounts to twenty-five groups per session. We adopted a pre-determined matching 
protocol to arrange participants into groups across the five cycles. This was done to ensure no 
one could interact with anyone else for more than one cycle. In each cycle, participants were 
paired exclusively within their group. Each group included only participants who neither 
belonged to an identical group in some past cycle, nor would belong to an identical group in a 
future cycle. Participants were informed about this matching protocol.  Cycles terminated 
simultaneously for all groups. 
In each cycle, group participants were matched at random. In each round each participant 
randomly met one of the three other possible counterparts, with equal probability. Hence, each 
participant had one third probability of meeting anyone else from their group in each round of a 
cycle, although they could not identify them. Once pairs were formed, in each pair a computer-
determined coin flip assigned a seller role to one player, and a buyer role to the other. Hence, in 
each round every group was always composed of two buyers and two sellers, and participants 
were equally likely to change or keep their role across two consecutive rounds. This completes 
the description of what we call the Baseline treatment. 
In the two additional treatments, called Information Provision and Information Request, we 
modified the Baseline design by adding a prototypical monitoring institution (Table 1). Each of 
these additional treatments introduces the possibility for participants to build a reputation 
through the creation of individual records while preserving anonymity of interaction. One 
institution (Provision) has function similar to the Better Business Bureau, where a buyer’s record 
is a public good and the seller can freely view it. The other institution (Request) is more similar 
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to a credit agency, where the buyer’s record is a private good and the seller must pay to view it. 
Neither treatment can offer as much information as would be available with public monitoring.  
 
 Baseline Information Provision  Information Request 
Monitoring No 
Yes: 
buyer pays 1 point to 
report counterpart’s action 
Yes: 
seller pays 1 point to see 
counterpart’s record 
Information to seller 
No information about  
counterpart’s past 
conduct 
Summary of counterpart’s 
actions reported by buyers 
Summary of counterpart’s 
actions taken in the past 
Average no. of rounds 50.5 68.5 76.5 
 
Table 1: Experimental treatments 
Notes: Seller was called Red in the experiment and buyer was called Blue. Conversion rate: 1 point = 2.5 dollar 
cents. The sessions were run in Sep-Nov 2008. Two sessions for each treatment: one session was run at Purdue 
University and the other at the University of Iowa. 
 
Information Provision treatment. This treatment adds a post-exchange stage along the lines 
of the decentralized model of monitoring developed in Milgrom et al. (1990). After observing the 
outcome of the helping game, the buyer can pay 1 point to truthfully report the seller’s action. 
This information is added to her opponent’s record, which is empty in round 1 of a cycle. 
Alternatively, the buyer can choose not to make a report. The seller never sees the buyer’s choice 
in this post-exchange stage. In any given round of a cycle, the record of a participant spans (at 
most) the six preceding rounds in that same cycle.
1
 The record excludes the participant’s identity 
and displays a summary of her history that is based on voluntary reports. It includes the number 
of past rounds in which: the participant was a seller, her action was not reported, and her 
reported action was cooperation or defection. Before making a choice, the seller can review at no 
cost the record of the buyer and her own record. The buyer does not observe any record. Since 
                                                 
1
 The expected duration of a cycle was about 14 rounds. Limiting records to 6 rounds allowed for some learning by 
insuring that an initial mistake would not permanently stain the reputation of a participant.  
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records are anonymous (identities are excluded from records) random matching implies that 
sellers cannot directly identify a past opponent by simply looking at a record. Possible payoffs 
and outcomes are the same as in the Baseline treatment, with the exception that payoffs for 
buyers include the loss of 1 point if they report the seller’s action. If no action is ever reported, 
then the Provision treatment is equivalent to the Baseline treatment. 
Information Request treatment. This treatment adds a pre-exchange stage. Before making a 
choice in the helping game, the seller can pay 1 point to view the buyer’s record. Alternatively, 
the seller can choose not to view the buyer’s record. The buyer never sees the seller’s action in 
this pre-exchange stage. As in the Provision treatment, the participant’s record spans (at most) 
the six preceding rounds in that cycle and does not include the participant’s identity. Unlike the 
Provision treatment, the record is a summary based on an accurate and complete history of the 
roles and actions taken by the participant in those six previous rounds. The record displays the 
number of rounds in which: the participant was a seller, and the number of cooperative and 
defection actions taken as a seller. Possible payoffs and outcomes are as in the Baseline 
treatment, with the exception that the seller pays 1 point to view the buyer’s record.2  
The Provision and Request treatments exhibit elements of commonality. First, a participant’s 
record includes only information about her past actions as a seller, which helps in building a 
reputation but does not necessarily reveal all past outcomes (e.g., outcomes experienced as a 
buyer). This means that a participant’s record cannot reveal a past defection unless that 
participant was the seller in that round and she defected. Second, a seller can only view the 
record of the buyer she is currently matched to, and the record does not reveal the buyer’s 
                                                 
2
 The Provision and Request treatments can be interpreted as introducing an institution that processes, respectively, 
the information truthfully provided by individuals in the group and all the available information; see Kandori (1992) 
for a similar interpretation. The institution marks individuals who have defected and the mark is publicly observable 
at no cost in one case (Provision), but not in the other (Request). 
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identity (=anonymity). Lastly, a participant’s record neither includes the history of his 
opponents, nor the histories that the participant observed. For example, the record does not say if 
participants defected after observing a defection. 
Considering all treatments, we recruited 120 participants through announcements in 
undergraduate classes, half at Purdue University and half at the University of Iowa. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Given 
the random termination protocol, we recruited participants for three hours. Instructions (a copy is 
in the Appendix) were read aloud at the start of the experiment and left on the participants’ 
desks. No eye contact was possible among participants. Average earnings were about $17 per 
participant. On average, a session lasted 65.2 rounds for a running time of 2 hours, including 
instruction reading and a quiz.  Details about the sessions are provided in Table 1. 
 
3. Theoretical predictions 
Here, we demonstrate that—under the assumption of identical players that are self-interested and 
risk-neutral—the equilibrium set consists of multiple equilibria in all treatments. The 
equilibrium set includes full defection and full cooperation, which is the efficient outcome. The 
following analysis is based on the folk theorem-like results established in Kandori (1992) and 
Ellison (1994). 
     Start by observing that defection is the dominant strategy if the helping game is played once 
or if it is finitely repeated. In an indefinitely repeated game, the payoff is the (ex-ante) expected 
discounted stream of payoffs attained in each of the one-shot interactions. In the Baseline 
treatment participants can neither observe the outcome in other pairs (private monitoring), nor 
can they identify or communicate with their counterparts (anonymity). In this scenario, ―always 
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defect‖ is always a sequential equilibrium because defect is a best response to everyone else 
defecting in every round in which they are sellers. In this case, the equilibrium payoff in the 
repeated game corresponds to the present discounted value a/(). 
We next prove that the efficient outcome can also be sustained as a sequential equilibrium, as 
long as δ is sufficiently large. To prove it, following Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), we 
conjecture that all players adopt a rule of behavior called ―grim trigger strategy‖, consisting of a 
―desirable‖ action as sellers and of a sanction that is implemented as soon as the player finds out 
that some seller acted in an undesirable manner. We identify the desirable action with 
cooperation and the sanction with defection. The grim trigger strategy thus stipulates that the 
player should cooperate whenever she is a seller, as long as she has never experienced a 
defection; otherwise, she should always defect and never cooperate again. 
This strategy relies on a form of community (or, decentralized) punishment that is used to 
police defections. Community punishment implies an incremental defection process in the group. 
The first seller who defects triggers an unstoppable punishment process which eventually leads 
to full defection. This threat is precisely what supports cooperation in the model. 
 
Proposition 1. In the indefinitely repeated helping game if >0.808, then a social norm based on 
the grim trigger strategy supports the efficient outcome as a sequential equilibrium. 
The sketch of the proof is as follows.
3
 In each round payoffs for (seller, buyer) are (u, d) if 
cooperation is the outcome, and (a, a) otherwise. If everyone adopts the grim trigger strategy, 
i.e., if such strategy is a social norm, then in equilibrium every seller cooperates so the payoff to 
a representative player is the expected discounted utility from buying or selling with equal 
                                                 
3
 Details of the proof are available in the Supplementary Materials to Camera and Casari (2014) 
 10 
probability, (u+d)/[2(1)]. One needs to check two incentive compatibility elements: first, the 
―grim‖ punishment threat must remove a seller’s temptation to defect in any equilibrium round; 
second, it must also ensure that a seller has an incentive to follow the punishment norm, off-
equilibrium. In doing so, we rely on the unimprovability criterion and consider one-time 
deviations by a single seller. 
Since surplus is lost if the group moves from full cooperation to full defection, then a one-
time equilibrium defection is suboptimal as long as players foresee a sufficiently long 
interaction. Equivalently—as reported in Proposition 1—players must be sufficiently patient. 
Intuitively, the future reward from cooperating today must be greater than the extra utility 
provided by defecting today. If grim trigger is a social norm, then the initial defection will 
quickly lead to 100% defections because there are only four players in our groups. The rapid 
spread of punishment to the entire group also explains why sellers have no incentive to cooperate 
after observing a defection, such as in an attempt to stop the contagious punishment process in its 
tracks. 
 
Proposition 2. In the Baseline treatment the equilibrium set includes full defection and the 
efficient outcome. In the Provision and Request treatments, the addition of monitoring 
institutions neither eliminates any of the equilibria available in the Baseline treatment, nor 
expands the efficiency frontier. 
     To prove the first part of the statement, note that, due to indefinite repetition, if all 
participants play grim trigger, then the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential 
equilibrium. Given that in the experimental design the continuation probability is =0.93, then 
according to Proposition 1 the efficient outcome is an equilibrium in every treatment and in 
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every group. As noted above, full defection is also an equilibrium because defection in a round is 
always a best response if every other seller is expected to defect in every round. 
     The second part of the statement immediately follows because monitoring can always be 
ignored. Simply put, none of the strategies available in the Baseline treatment condition on 
information about counterparts, and all of such strategies are always available in all other 
treatments. The central consequence is that the efficient outcome can be supported in all 
treatments and therefore the Provision and Request treatments do not expand the set of 
equilibrium payoffs. 
It should be clear that additional strategies are available when participants can monitor past 
conduct, compared to when they cannot. Indeed, the monitoring institutions we introduced allow 
sellers to have accurate information of the counterpart’s past behavior. In Request, a seller can 
always view an accurate record of the actions her counterpart took as a seller in the last 6 rounds. 
In Provision, accurate records can be created if buyers choose to report the seller’s action to a 
public repository. Although the additional strategies made possible through monitoring do not 
introduce Pareto-superior equilibria, they do expand the equilibrium set and therefore they might 
actually increase strategic uncertainty and coordination problems relative to the Baseline 
treatment. Yet, the expanded strategy set in the Provision and Request treatments neither 
constrains participants to employ strategies that condition on the counterpart’s past conduct, nor 
precludes the use of social norms based on decentralized enforcement. 
Given this expanded strategy set, it is meaningful to quantify the efficiency that can be 
theoretically achieved through monitoring. We define the efficiency loss as 100% minus the 
realized surplus over the maximum surplus. Every strategy that uses monitoring generates a 
deadweight loss that lowers the efficiency frontier for any cooperation level achieved. In 
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Provision and Request, the long-run efficiency loss from creating and viewing opponents’ 
records is below 16.7%. The maximum loss occurs when all participants report and view the 
actions of all opponents, which costs 2 points out of a maximum surplus of 12 in each economy.
4
  
To summarize, monitoring cannot expand the theoretical efficiency frontier relative to the 
Baseline treatment. In fact, its use would simply lower the theoretical efficiency frontier. 
However, we know from previous work (Camera and Casari, 2014) that coordination on 
strategies that support the efficient outcome is difficult because of the multiplicity of equilibria. 
It is therefore an open question whether or not the introduction of monitoring (i) may alter 
cooperation rates relative to the Baseline treatment and (ii) if it may facilitate coordination on the 
efficient equilibrium. 
 
4. Results 
There are four key results: Result 1 is on cooperation levels, Result 2 compares the strategies 
employed across treatments, Result 3 is about the deadweight loss from using the monitoring 
institutions, while Result 4 concerns the distribution of earnings. In this section the empirical 
analysis adopts as unit of observation a group of four participants interacting in a cycle.
5
  
 
Result 1. In all treatments, the average cooperation rate was well below 100%. In the 
Information Provision and Information Request treatments, rates were similar or lower than in 
the Baseline treatment. 
Support for this result comes from Figure 1 and Tables 2, 3 and 4.    
                                                 
4
 With information provision, a buyer could report only the first defection observed and still generate an accurate 
record. Here we do not characterize the optimal strategy for providing information and for requesting information 
because it is beyond the scope of this study. 
5
 Data from the Baseline treatment are also analyzed in Camera and Casari (2014). 
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Figure 1. Cooperation by treatment 
 
Average cooperation in the Provision treatment was 37.5%, which is at least 10.7% lower than 
Baseline (Mann-Whitney test, p-values=0.031, n1=50, n2=50). Moreover, there is an 11.9% gap 
with the Request treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-values=0.026, n1=50, n2=50). Average 
cooperation in Request is not significantly different from Baseline (Mann-Whitney test, p-
value=0.97, n1=50, n2=50). These observations confirm that cooperation in this environment is 
difficult to support even when participants have a monitoring technology at their disposal. 
 When we focus on average cooperation in round 1 of each cycle, we find that the highest 
cooperation rate is 51.0% (Table 3). Behavior in round 1 can reveal the existence of a focal point 
but we find little evidence of a focal point. Monitoring did not improve the ability of groups to 
coordinate on either cooperation or defection. The rates of coordination on either action in round 
1 were 58% in Baseline, 30% in Provision, and 46% in Request. The treatment ranking in terms 
of coordination on cooperation or cooperation levels is identical (Table 3). 
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Cycle Baseline Provision Request 
1 0.475 0.410 0.388 
2 0.441 0.342 0.526 
3 0.563 0.448 0.485 
4 0.487 0.425 0.543 
5 0.446 0.249 0.530 
Overall cooperation frequency 0.482 0.375 0.494 
Net surplus (points) 5.78 4.01 5.69 
Gross surplus (points) 5.78 4.50 5.93 
Max theoretical surplus (points) 12 12 12 
Table 2: Average cooperation rate: all rounds 
Notes:  1 obs. = 1 economy (10 obs. per cycle, per treatment). To calculate gross surplus in the Provision and 
Request treatments multiply the average cooperation rate by the maximum surplus (12 points). To obtain net 
surplus, subtract from gross surplus the cost of the institution, i.e., 2 points multiplied by the frequency with which 
buyer (in Provision) or seller (in Request) used the institution.  
 
Cycle Baseline Provision Request 
1 0.40 0.40 0.20 
2 0.30 0.45 0.45 
3 0.55 0.50 0.70 
4 0.55 0.40 0.60 
5 0.75 0.50 0.60 
Overall frequency of cooperation 0.51 0.45 0.51 
Fraction of groups with 100% cooperation 0.30 0.10 0.24 
Fraction of groups with 100% defection 0.28 0.20 0.22 
Table 3: Average cooperation rate: round 1 of each cycle 
 
The probit regressions in Table 4 supply additional evidence about the poor performance of the 
monitoring treatments in terms of cooperation rates. The dependent variable is a seller's choice to 
cooperate (1) or not (0) in a round. When pooling all observations, cooperation in the Provision 
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treatment is significantly lower than in the Baseline treatment (the marginal effect is of -9.8 
percentage points, p-value 0.013, see column 2, Table 4). By contrast, cooperation in the Request 
treatment is statistically indistinguishable from the Baseline treatment (the marginal effect is of 
0.1 percentage points, p-value 0.967, see column 2, Table 4). The regressions include controls 
for fixed effects (cycles, rounds within the cycle), for demographic characteristics, including 
gender and major, and for the duration of the previous cycle. In addition, the regressions trace 
the response of the representative participant in the rounds following an observed defection, as 
reported in Result 2 below. 
 
 All Treatments Baseline Provision Request 
Dependent variable: 
1=cooperation 
0=defection 
(1) 
Rounds 1 only 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment dummies:      
   Information Provision -0.040 -0.098**    
 (0.054) (0.039)    
   Information Request 0.033 0.001    
 (0.103) (0.035)    
Seller's record in Provision has: 
   at least one cooperative action 
   0.239***  
    (0.003)  
   at least one defection action    -0.135***  
    (0.003)  
Buyer's record in Provision has: 
   at least one cooperative action 
   0.157***  
    (0.010)  
   at least one defection action    -0.096**  
    (0.045)  
Buyer’s record in Request has:   
   cooperation rate > 50%  
    0.415*** 
     (0.024) 
   defection rate > 50%     -0.020 
     (0.102) 
 Strategy coding: 
   grim trigger 
 -0.488*** -0.416*** -0.229*** -0.535*** 
  (0.057) (0.045) (0.009) (0.042) 
   Lag 1   0.025 0.102 0.036*** 0.005 
  (0.034) (0.115) (0.011) (0.073) 
   Lag 2  -0.032* -0.007 -0.008 -0.027*** 
  (0.016) (0.028) (0.021) (0.007) 
Risk neutral or low Risk 
aversion (questionnaire) 
0.062 0.114 0.091 0.305*** -0.034 
 (0.083) (0.072) (0.114) (0.044) (0.078) 
 16 
 All Treatments Baseline Provision Request 
Dependent variable: 
1=cooperation 
0=defection 
(1) 
Rounds 1 only 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
High Risk aversion 
(questionnaire) 
-0.208** -0.090 -0.066 -0.207*** 0.031 
 (0.093) (0.087) (0.149) (0.068) (0.059) 
 
Controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.111 0.114 0.077 0.265 0.173 
Observations 300 3950 1010 1370 1570 
 
Table 4: Probit regression on the seller’s choice to cooperate – marginal effects 
Notes: Each observation refers to a seller in a pair. Marginal effects are computed at the mean value of regressors. 
For a continuous variable the marginal effect measures the change in the likelihood to cooperate for an infinitesimal 
change of the independent variable. For a dummy variable the marginal effect measures the change in the likelihood 
to cooperate for a discrete change of the dummy variable. Round fixed effects are included (except in the first 
column) but not reported in the table (rounds 2-5, 6-10, 11-17, 18-25, >25). Controls are not reported and include 
cycles dummies 2, 3, 4, 5, duration of previous cycle (set to 14.3 rounds for cycle 1), Iowa location, Male, Business 
major, and Engineering, Science, and Mathematics major. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are computed 
with a cluster on each session; * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
 
Result 2. When a monitoring institution was available, the strategy of the representative seller 
conditioned on both the buyer’s and her own record. Moreover, in Request, participants 
increased their reliance on grim trigger, while in Provision they reduced it in comparison to 
Baseline.  
Support is provided by the regression in Table 4. The regression traces the response over time of 
an individual in his seller’s role to the defection of her opponent. We study the first two actions 
taken after suffering a defection. The econometric technique we employ allows us to identify the 
adoption of community punishment schemes such as grim trigger or T-round punishment. We 
construct three variables. The grim trigger variable takes value 1 in all rounds following the 
observed initial defection, and 0 otherwise. The Lag variables pertain to specific rounds in which 
the participant has an opportunity to punish after first experiencing a defection as a buyer. The 
Lag 1 variable takes value 1 at the first opportunity to punish by defecting, and 0 otherwise; the 
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Lag 2 variable takes value 1 at the second opportunity to punish by defecting.
6
 
     In all treatments, behavior is consistent with the representative participant using the grim 
trigger strategy because we observe a persistent decline in cooperation after experiencing a 
defection. The grim trigger marginal effects are all negative and highly significant (columns 3, 4, 
5 in Table 4).  One monitoring institutions enhanced the reliance on grim trigger, while the other 
reduced it. The sum of the estimated marginal effects of grim trigger, Lag1 and Lag2 are -0.56 
for Request, -0.20 for Provision, while for Baseline we have -0.32 (Table 4). 
 We now study how participants modified strategies in response to the possibility of accessing 
the history of actions of the opponent. In theory, introducing monitoring leaves untouched the set 
of discount factors supporting the efficient outcome because participants can always abstain from 
exploiting monitoring. However, if knowing the past behavior of an opponent is the key to 
raising cooperation levels in anonymous groups, then one should observe an extensive use of the 
monitoring institution. In the experiment, participants actively employed monitoring. Buyers in 
the Provision treatment on average reported 24.5% of the sellers’ choices; sellers in the Request 
treatment paid a cost to inspect the record of their buyer in 12.1% of cases. 
    The experiment offers an opportunity to study patterns of information flows because 
participants actively provided and requested information. In both treatments there is evidence 
that the actions of the representative participant were significantly affected by their own and their 
opponent’s records. The regressions in Table 4 show that in Provision and Request a seller was 
significantly more willing to cooperate with opponents who cooperated in the past (columns 4-
5). In addition, in the Provision treatment, sellers were significantly less willing to cooperate 
with opponents who defected at least once (Table 4, columns 4). This behavior is consistent with 
motivations related to indirect reciprocity or conditional cooperation.  
                                                 
6
 For a detailed discussion on this econometric technique see Camera and Casari (2009). 
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 In the Provision treatments the use of the monitoring institutions was inefficient because of a 
lack of coordination. Participants would gain from coordinating on reporting either cooperation 
or defection, but not both. In particular, given a goal to sustain full cooperation, reporting only 
defection actions is the less costly strategy. Instead, buyers sometimes reported cooperation and 
sometimes reported defection. Buyers reported cooperative actions in 33.1% of cases and 
reported defection in 16.0% of cases (N=1370). In sum, there is evidence that Provision and 
Request, which can reduce informational frictions, were ineffective in increasing cooperation 
relative to the baseline. The active use of monitoring had also implications for realized surplus. 
 
Result 3. The empirical deadweight loss from using the monitoring institutions was 2.0% of total 
surplus in Information Provision and 4.1% in Information Request.  
Support for Result 3 comes from Table 2. The direct costs of monitoring were small overall. In 
the Request treatment, the cost of monitoring derives from the 1 point paid by sellers to view the 
buyers’ record. The average empirical cost for the group was 0.49 points out of a total surplus of 
12 points in a round. In the Provision treatment, the cost is 0.24 points. Given the realized 
cooperation rate and costs of the monitoring institution, one can calculate two measures of 
surplus. The net surplus for a group corresponds to the total points earned over and above the 
defection payoff. The gross surplus is the sum of the net surplus and the cost of the monitoring 
institution. The Baseline treatment achieves the highest net surplus, which is 5.78 points out of a 
maximum of 12 points. The Provision treatment attains the minimum net surplus of 4.01 (Table 
2). 
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Figure 2. Participants’ average profits by average frequency of cooperation 
Notes: Next to each data point, we report the associated percentage of observations. Only observations where 
participants switch roles within the cycle are included (about 170 per treatment). Earnings were adjusted to account 
for the uneven frequency of a participant’s buyer and seller role: we separately computed average profits as buyer 
and as seller and then took their arithmetic average. Figure 2 does not qualitatively change when using raw average 
profits. 
 
Result 4. The addition of a monitoring institution redistributed surplus from frequent defectors 
to frequent cooperators to an extent insufficient to alter the incentives to coordinate on the 
efficient outcome.  
Support for this result comes from the illustration of the average per-capita profits in a round in 
Figure 2, which can range from a minimum of 8 (=(8+8)/2) through a maximum of 11 
(=(20+2)/2). We divide participants into five types according to their frequency of cooperation in 
Baseline 
Information Provision 
Information Request 
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a cycle. In the Provision treatment, there is no evidence that monitoring brings about a 
redistribution of surplus from frequent defectors [0, 0.2) to frequent cooperators [0.8, 1] with 
respect to Baseline, while there is some evidence in the Request treatment. Given that the 
availability of monitoring allows participants to identify free-riders, one would have expected 
monitoring to reduce payoffs of for frequent defectors and to increase payoffs for frequent 
cooperators in comparison to Baseline. While in Request, one can notice a relative increase in 
the payoff of frequent cooperators and a relative decrease in payoffs for frequent defectors, no 
such redistributive pattern is evident in Provision. 
 
5. Related experimental literature 
The previous experimental literature on indefinitely repeated games mostly focuses on settings 
characterized by interaction that is strategic in the one-shot game, and takes place among 
partners (Dal Bó, 2005, Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011, Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994). By contrast, 
this study considers an individual decision problem in each round of a supergame that is played 
among strangers. In both settings, the stage game is a social dilemma and there are multiple 
equilibria. However, the design widely employed in the literature is more conducive to reaching 
high levels of coordination on cooperation then the design of this study because, in that widely 
used design, it is easier to resolve the inherent strategic uncertainty over the course of the game. 
     There is also a literature that has investigated finitely repeated interaction of social dilemmas, 
where coordination problems can emerge either in the presence of behavioral types of 
individuals (Cox et al., 2015) or when individuals have social preferences (Chen et al., 2014). By 
contrast, in our design individuals are assumed identical and self-interested, and coordination 
problems emerge because of the indefinite horizon of interaction.  
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    Previous work on indefinitely repeated social dilemmas has illustrated the difficulties inherent 
to coordinating on the efficient outcome both in large and small groups (Camera and Casari, 
2009, Camera et al., 2013). Various remedies have been investigated to overcome coordination 
challenges. One branch of literature considers how reputation mechanisms may promote 
cooperation. For instance, Stahl (2009), Van Huyck et al. (1995), Ule et al. (2009), and Bolton et 
al. (2005) endow laboratory participants with a ready-made, costless reputational information-
sharing technology. In an indefinitely repeated game, Stahl (2009) finds that a color-coded 
monitoring mechanism was not always effective at improving cooperation. In the field, however, 
monitoring institutions often require an effort or are endogenously created by the individual, 
which is an aspect that we study in the experiment. In our design, monitoring institutions are 
costly and monitoring past conduct involves an explicit action from the decision-maker.  
 
6. Final considerations 
We have studied an indefinitely repeated social dilemma among strangers, where there is a social 
benefit from intertemporal cooperation and participants are prevented from relying on relational 
contracting. The game is characterized by multiple equilibria hence there is an issue of strategic 
uncertainty and equilibrium selection (Van Huyck et al., 1991). Presuming that participants aim 
at attaining the efficient outcome, they must be capable to coordinate on a suitable convention of 
decentralized punishment to remove opportunistic motivations. What sets this study apart from 
the bulk of the experimental literature on coordination is the presence of equilibrium multiplicity 
in the supergame and not in the stage game (Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011). 
     We studied various forms of monitoring of conduct: in the Request treatment, participants can 
receive accurate information about the counterpart while in the Provision treatment participants 
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can create an accurate public record of individual conduct.  Did better monitoring allow 
participants to achieve similar or better coordination on the inter-temporal giving and receiving 
of goods compared to a cooperative convention? The short answer is no (Result 1), even if better 
monitoring helped in some respects to simplify the coordination task. To see this, note that in 
Request treatment having the option to pay to view the past history of the opponent allows 
subsets of participants to coordinate on history-dependent strategies. For example, some 
participants may choose to cooperate only with those who have immaculate cooperation records 
even if not everyone in their group does so. With Information Provision, this strategy is possible 
only if everyone in the group coordinates on making reports and on using a history-dependent 
strategy, because information on past actions is not already available and must be created by the 
group. However, neither Request nor Provision treatments helped in coordinating on sanctioning 
strategies that effectively removed the incentives to defect (Result 2), despite their relatively low 
cost (Result 3). What’s more, neither Information Request nor Information Provision 
redistributed enough surplus from defectors to cooperators to influence the selection of a 
cooperative equilibrium (Result 4). 
If improving knowledge of past behaviors through monitoring is the key to reducing the 
temptation to defect, then the Request and Provision treatments should exhibit a larger favorable 
impact on cooperation than the Baseline treatment. In practice, the data reveals that monitoring 
institutions available in the Provision and Request treatments are at best ineffective in increasing 
cooperation relative to the Baseline. Additional experiments with variations in monitoring may 
further corroborate this conclusion and help uncover what additional elements are needed to 
enhance the effectiveness of monitoring institutions.  
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